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1.  INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The efficiency of the banking sector and the indicators of competition in the 
credit markets deserve special attention in countries where the financial sources 
of corporations are provided foremost by the banking sector. A more efficient 
banking sector and more intense competition yield lower funding costs for the 
real economy and greater financial deepening and hence, they strengthen po-
tential output growth. However, excessive credit market competition may give 
rise to higher willingness to take risks, which weakens financial stability and 
increases the probability of systemic financial crises. From a regulatory point 
of view, therefore, changes in the level of these indicators may carry important 
information.
The most usual way to measure the efficiency of banks is by calculating simple 
ratios like the cost-to-asset ratio (operating expenses divided by the balance sheet 
total) or the cost-to-income ratio (operating expenses divided by some aggregate 
income category). While these ratios have the advantage of easy calculation, this 
alleviates comparison between many market participants (even on an interna-
tional level) and the comparison itself can be highly distorted if the business 
profile of institutions is markedly different. That is one of the main reasons why 
it can be useful to evaluate bank efficiency not only with simple indicators based 
on the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement, but through model estima-
tions as well.
Bank efficiency is measured by two types of models: data envelopment analy-
sis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Both the models’ aim is to 
estimate the efficiency of institutions compared to a frontier market participant 
inside a given population. This means that both DEA and SFA models tackle 
efficiency in a relative sense, and the estimation results cannot tell us anything 
about the population’s (e.g. banking sector in a given country) efficiency in ab-
solute terms. 
There is no consensus in the literature on which type of models is more ap-
propriate. The DEA models are nonparametric estimations and they were first ap-
plied in the article of Charnes et al. (1978). In DEA models, the efficient frontier 
is the result of a sequence of linear programming exercises and the model identi-
fies any deviation from it as inefficiency. The advantage of this approach is that 
there is no need to make assumptions on the form of the cost function. The use of 
the second model was first proposed by two articles in parallel with each other: 
Aigner et al. (1977), and Meeusen – Van den Broeck (1977). The SFA models 
are based on econometric estimation where deviation from the efficient frontier 
is decomposed into a random error and an inefficiency term. Thus, the advantage 
of these models is that inefficiency is not calculated as a residual, and random ef-
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fects may also deter banks from the efficient frontier. However, the disadvantage 
of SFA models is that preliminary assumptions must be made on the form of the 
cost function and the distribution of the error terms, which might lead to mis-
specification and biased estimators.
Since both the model types have limitations and advantages, both are often 
used. Although the literature on bank efficiency estimation is extremely diverse, 
relatively few articles compare the results of the various estimates. The first ar-
ticle in this regard is the study by Ferrier – Lovell (1990), which estimates the 
cost efficiency of US banks by using both DEA and SFA methods. They found 
that although the two techniques yield very similar results regarding the ineffi-
ciencies on average, their conclusions about the efficiency ranking of individual 
banks are different. Eisenbeis et al. (1997) also used US data to compare these 
two techniques; however, their results are not consistent with the previous article. 
The authors found that efficiency levels were different but the ranking of banks 
was very similar under the two methods. Similarly, Bauer et al. (1998) compared 
the efficiency estimates on the US banks derived from a DEA model and other 
3 parametric models (including SFA model). They concluded that the parametric 
methods tended to yield higher average cost efficiencies than the DEA model. 
While correlation between the rankings of individual models was low and the dif-
ferent approaches identified the best and the worst banks differently. Moreover, 
each technique proved to be stable over time, but the DEA model slightly outper-
formed the parametric estimates. However, the standard financial efficiency in-
dicators (such as the ratio of operating costs to total assets) were more correlated 
with the estimates of parametric methods.
Huang – Wang (2002) and subsequently Dong et al. (2014) were the first au-
thors to compare the parametric and the nonparametric methods on Asian data. 
Using Taiwanese data, the former study found that the two methodologies yield 
similar average efficiency estimates, yet they resulted in different efficiency rank-
ings of banks. The latter article relied on Chinese banking sector data and found 
significant differences between the parametric and the nonparametric estimates.
Although results pertaining to the European banking sector are incoherent, the 
conclusions of more recent articles are very similar to those estimated on the US 
and Asian data. Drake – Weyman-Jones (1996) estimated cost efficiency among 
the UK institutions by using DEA and SFA approaches, while Resti (1997) did 
the same in relation to data on the Italian banking sector. These studies found no 
significant differences between the results yielded by the two techniques neither 
in terms of level nor in terms of ranking. Weill (2004) examined efficiency on a 
sample of Western European banks with both the parametric and the nonparamet-
ric methods and found that the average efficiency scores estimated by different 
models were similar, but the rankings across banks were different. The article 
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also examined the relationship between cost efficiency, size and specialisation, 
and the results yielded by various methods showed differences once again. Casu 
et al. (2004) examined the degree and the cause of improvement in productiv-
ity by means of the parametric and the nonparametric models also on a sample 
of Western European banks. Although their various estimates led to the same 
results at sector-level, the models attributed productivity improvement to differ-
ent factors. Delis et al. (2009) made comparisons between the cost and the profit 
efficiencies estimated by DEA and SFA models based on a panel dataset of Greek 
banks. Their results suggested greater correlations between the results of cost and 
profit efficiency methods than between the results of DEA and SFA models.
To the best of our knowledge, no comparisons have been made between the 
results of different models in relation to the Eastern European countries, and 
even the profit and cost efficiency measurement for Greece was compared only 
by Delis et al. (2009). The lower number of banks and the faster technological 
changes driven by the convergence process may render efficiency estimates more 
difficult and uncertain, which provides an even greater reason for the use of sev-
eral models and the comparison of their results.
In regard to the bank efficiency, the 2008 financial crisis also raised a number 
of important questions. Firstly, is there a relationship between the efficiency of 
the banking system and the intensity of financial crises? Secondly, did the events 
of 2008 exert any impact on the efficiency of banks? Regarding the first question, 
Diallo (2017) found that more efficient banking sectors were hit less seriously by 
the global crisis. The author used the DEA method to measure the efficiency of 
the banking sector. Based on data derived from the South-East European coun-
tries, Nurboja – Kosak (2017) concluded that the crisis provided an incentive for 
banks to enhance their cost efficiency (calculated by an SFA model). One purpose 
of this study is to examine the second question using Hungarian data; namely, 
how did the banking sector efficiency evolve and was there any material shift 
in efficiency at the sector-level as a result of the crisis. According to our results, 
the cost efficiency undoubtedly but moderately improved in the post-crisis years. 
As regards the profit efficiency, however, various estimates did not yield such 
straightforward results: the models pointed to stagnation or a downturn in the first 
few years of the crisis. Moreover, although the profit efficiency improved in the 
period of recovery (from 2013), it is not clear whether this efficiency returned to 
or exceeded the  pre-crisis levels.
In terms of the cost efficiency, the outbreak of the 2008 crisis is important 
also because of the rise in credit losses and the expansion of non-performing 
loans. As the crisis unfolded, banks’ non-performing portfolios and credit losses 
surged both in the emerging and the developing European economies, but the 
increase showed significant differences between individual banks, in terms of 
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banks’ diverging risk appetite. In order to factor in this phenomenon, we added 
credit losses to the costs typically used in the literature. Then, we compared the 
results of those models where the differences in risk acceptance were taken into 
consideration with those where they were ignored.
In this study, we estimated the cost and the profit efficiency on Hungarian data 
both with DEA and SFA models and compared the results based on the criteria 
proposed by Bauer et al. (1998). According to our estimates, there are relevant 
differences between the estimates produced by the two approaches, especially in 
the case of cost efficiency. The profit efficiency estimates performed better than 
the cost efficiency estimates even in terms of stability and correlation with clas-
sical profitability indicators. Disregarding credit risks may imply the loss of im-
portant information; however, it may improve the stability of the estimate. Based 
on the example of the Hungarian banking sector, this study calls attention to three 
important considerations: (1) the results derived from DEA and SFA methods 
may often lead to different conclusions, which underpins the importance of rely-
ing on as many methodologies as possible in efficiency estimates; (2) the size of 
the credit risks may warrant their inclusion in the efficiency estimates; and (3) 
owing to the heterogeneity of banks’ loan portfolios, the main credit segments (at 
least the household and the corporate segments) should be included separately in 
the model.
Previous studies regarding the Hungarian banking sector’s cost efficiency did 
not offer a straightforward conclusion.  Depending on the methodology, the es-
timated period and the sample, the estimates classify the Hungarian banks into 
mixed categories: some studies place them among the leaders of the CEE coun-
tries (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. 2009), others (Fries – Taci 2005; Niţoia – 
Spulbar 2015) in the middle of the ranking, yet others (Molnár – Holló 2011) 
among the least efficient ones. In terms of bank competition, literature found 
diverging trends in the household and the corporate credit segments.  Previous 
studies focused primarily on frictions in the household credit market,1 while in-
tensive competition was reported in the corporate credit market.
We calculated Lerner indices by using the SFA type cost functions. In our 
estimates household and corporate loans were treated as separate outputs based 
on the assumption that the two credit markets behave differently.2 This expecta-
tion was confirmed by the estimated Lerner indices. The intensity of competition 
proved to be different in the two segments both in terms of level and dynamics. 
1  See, for example, Móré – Nagy (2003, 2004), Molnár et al. (2007) and Kézdi – Csorba (2012). 
Aczél et al. (2016) also emphasise the role of market power as a determinant of housing loan 
spreads.
2 The reason behind this is explained in detail in Section 2.
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We constructed the indices by using two different methods in consideration of 
credit risks. This did not cause a significant variation between the estimates. Fi-
nally, we also compared the Lerner indices calculated on the basis of the average 
lending rate on new disbursements and on the outstanding portfolio. We found 
that the former tends to respond to market developments more quickly than the 
latter and therefore shows more significant variations. 
We structured our study as follows: Section 2 presents the specification of 
models, explains why we chose the assumptions concerned and provides a brief 
overview of the data used for our estimations. In Section 3 we discuss our find-
ings in detail, and finally in the last section we conclude. 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Numerous possible model specifications are available both for the DEA and the 
SFA type models, which are different from each other in terms of certain sub-
assumptions. We had two goals in mind when we selected the specification of 
the models: on the one hand, we wanted to ensure that our assumptions are as 
consistent with the known properties of the banking sector as possible, and on the 
other hand, we wanted our assumptions for DEA and SFA models to be the same 
wherever possible, for the sake of comparability.
In calculation of banks’ efficiency, we modelled the production process in each 
approach to examine how much output can be produced from certain inputs at the 
given input prices and how much did it cost or how much profit could be achieved. 
In these calculations, human resources and fixed assets are generally considered 
as inputs, and the loan portfolio, interest-bearing assets and/or all other assets are 
included as outputs. The models typically do not include more than three inputs 
or outputs; their number can be increased only with certain constraints.3
As mentioned above, we examined profit and cost efficiencies separately. The 
necessity of profit efficiency measurements comes from the heterogeneity of the 
model outputs, which can be attributed to numerous reasons for it to be different 
from cost efficiency. For example, the loan portfolio (which is typically included 
as a homogeneous product in the cost efficiency estimates) can be regarded as 
heterogeneous in several regards. This heterogeneity can be caused by potential 
maturity mismatches within the portfolios among other things. If a bank grants 
a higher percentage of shorter-term loans, it will face higher costs owing to the 
3  In the case of SFA models, this is probably because high number of explanatory variables in 
the estimation would significantly increase uncertainty. As regards to DEA models, too many 
business models would be considered efficient as a result.
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faster velocity of the loans, and the bank will end up having a worse cost efficien-
cy score than other banks. However, the lending rates on short-term loans might 
be higher; therefore, this bank will have higher revenues and may even perform 
better than other market participants in profit efficiency. Similarly, if a loan port-
folio is considered homogeneous, it gives rise to the problem that the performing 
and the non-performing portions of the portfolio will be treated by the models 
uniformly. This can alter the results significantly, especially in times of financial 
crises when the increase in the non-performing portfolio may considerably be 
different at individual institutions. This is because the earning potential of non-
performing portfolios is lower compared to the rest of the loans, whereas the op-
erating expenses associated with such portfolios is typically higher. The diverse 
cost implications of individual credit products also counteract homogeneity: for 
example, in household lending the disbursement of a mortgage loan and an unse-
cured consumer loan can imply substantially different costs, which is enforced by 
the bank in its pricing; i.e. in the profit. Therefore, if banks specialise in different 
segments and the number of outputs defined in the cost function is too low, then 
both DEA and SFA methods may identify inefficiencies even in cases where the 
higher or the lower level of costs simply results from different composition of 
assets. However, there are also arguments for the use of cost efficiency: profit ef-
ficiency is more sensitive to the cyclicality of the real economy as cyclical events 
affect the profit through risks and interest revenues as well. Consequently, the 
improvement in productivity could be better captured by cost efficiency.
We selected three products for our outputs: our models include household 
loans, corporate loans and other interest-bearing assets. From a theoretical per-
spective, the two credit markets may differ in costs, entry barriers and consumer 
behaviour. In the household credit market the same portfolio requires a broader 
branch network and a higher staff number on average compared to the corporate 
credit market, where loan sizes are larger. Building up the required branch net-
work also means a higher entry barrier in the market of household loans. Moreo-
ver, households tend to be less rational or less informed than corporate clients, 
and also they usually obtain loans of a considerably smaller amount.4 Another 
difference between the two segments is the difference of information asymmetry 
prevailing in these two markets: while banks can analyse the financial statements 
4  In view of this, it was by no accident that the foreign banks appearing in the CEE countries 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union often specialised in corporate lending; in fact, in many 
cases they followed the multinational corporations operating in the home countries of the re-
gion (Havrylchyk 2005). The case was similar in Hungary: with respect to household lending, 
foreign banks lagged behind the OTP Bank, a bank deeply rooted in the household segment 
for many years, which is also indicative of the former institutions’ competitive disadvantage 
and the higher costs of entry, typical in this segment.
182 ZSUZSANNA HOSSZÚ – BÁLINT DANCSIK
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
of companies allowing them to obtain information both before and after the trans-
action, this is only partly true for the household credit market, especially in the 
later years of the loan term.5 
Moreover, owing to the high share of loan products with unilaterally adjust-
able interest rates, banks had a pricing advantage in the Hungarian household 
credit market relative to the corporate credit market that was dominated by float-
ing rate schemes. Indeed, before 2012 the Hungarian legislative environment was 
lenient about the modification of lending terms during the term of the loan, and 
banks could conceive legal solutions that allowed them to unilaterally raise the 
interest rate on a loan at basically any time until it is matured. Most institutions 
took advantage of this opportunity, and after the outbreak of the crisis this led to 
an increase in the interest rates of already disbursed household loans by 150–200 
basis points on average. This scheme was far less common in the case of corpo-
rate loans, partly because of the better bargaining position of the sector and partly 
because of shorter maturities. Subsequently, we also test the marked differences 
between the two loan segments through the Lerner index. The heterogeneity of 
the loan portfolio in efficiency estimates is also justified by the differences men-
tioned above. 
The banking sector is often modelled as a financial intermediary or a money 
creator. In the first case, financial liabilities appear among the inputs, whereas de-
posits are included among the outputs in the latter assumption. In consideration of 
the Hungarian banking sector’s heavy reliance on foreign financing and because 
we already included three outputs with the decomposition of the loan portfolio, 
we opted for the financial intermediary approach.
In both the model types, certain constraints can be applied with respect to the 
returns to scale (if there is a constraint, it generally assumes constant returns to 
scale). Since we examined the banking sector of an emerging country that has 
suffered a series of structural breaks; and as severe market frictions should be 
expected due to asset market’s protracted adjustment resulting from the long ma-
turities, we assumed variable returns to scale.6
These models usually do not factor in the credit losses, even though they repre-
sent regular and significant expenditures for banks and their volume is not negligi-
ble compared to the operating expenses. At the same time, business (accounting) 
decisions and cyclical events may strongly influence the loan loss provisioning. 
5  Although at the conclusion of the contract even the household customers need to verify their 
financial and wealth situation, it is far more difficult for banks to monitor changes in the finan-
cial situation of a retail debtor in the later years of the term than in the case of corporate loans 
where regular accounting statements are readily available.
6  We also test this assumption and will discuss the results in more detail in the sections of  spe-
cific models.
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Since our sample also included a crisis period when credit losses were extremely 
high, we found it particularly important to explicitly include these expenses in 
our models. This procedure is not common in the literature and it is not clear how 
these items should be incorporated into the models. Our solution is described in 
the sections of specific models.
Time dimension is another important factor to consider when estimating DEA 
and SFA models. The relationship between inputs, prices and outputs is not only 
shaped by efficiency, which is in the centre of our interest, but also by macroeco-
nomic, regulatory and technological changes. These factors can be (somewhat) 
controlled for by dividing the sample to smaller subsamples with a shorter time-
frame, or by explicitly controlling for the time dimension by including time vari-
ables into the estimation. However, these solutions can be highly constrained if 
the database available is not long or wide enough (i.e. short time horizon, too few 
institutions) to include more variables in the parametric estimation. 
One can easily see that while model-based efficiency estimations are much 
more sophisticated compared to the calculation of simple accounting-based ra-
tios, the interpretation of such models can be tricky considering all the assump-
tions and the broad variety of possible modelling decisions. The higher number 
of possible model choices also indicates that there is some uncertainty around the 
concept of efficiency when estimating it with either the parametric or the non-
parametric models. 
2.1. SFA models
The total cost or total profit function can be written as:
 ( , , , , ),it it it it it itTC C Y W Z u e  (1)
where TCit is the total cost or total profit of bank i in period t. Yit is the vector of 
outputs, Wit is the vector of input prices and Zit is the vector of additional control 
variables in the case of bank i in period t. uit expresses the banks’ deviation from 
the efficient frontier, while eit is the random error. We estimate the equation in 
logarithmic form as follows:
  , ,it it it it it itlnTC c Y W Z lnu lne    (2)
where lnuit captures the deviation from the effi cient frontier and therefore, 
its value is always non-negative in cost functions and non-positive in 
profi t functions, and lneit  is a normally distributed random noise.
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We need at least two more assumptions for estimating the equation: the exact form 
of the cost function (c) and the distribution of the inefficiency term. In addition, it 
is also possible to include specific variables identifying uit (e.g. Greene 2005), but 
we did not opt for this solution for two reasons. Firstly, we did not want to impose 
further constraints and secondly, we wished to ensure the comparability of our 
results with DEA models. As regards to the cost function, we assumed the most 
widely used functional form in the literature: the translog function. We assumed 
that the distribution of uit was exponential. Accordingly, our estimated equation 
is the following:
 0
1
2
1
2
it j jt k kt jl jt lt
j k j l
km kt mt jk jt kt s st it it
k m j k s
lnTC lnY lnW lnY lnY
lnW lnW lnY lnW lnZ lnu lne
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θ μ
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  
  
 (3)
where TCit denotes total cost or total profit of bank i at time t, Yjt denotes total 
output of product j at time t, Wkt denotes input prices of input k at time t, and Zst 
denotes additional control variables at time t.
We derived the coefficients and the error terms from maximum likelihood es-
timation, in accordance with Wang’s (2002) estimation method. Some estimates 
included the household and the corporate loan loss provisioning as input prices, 
however, certain cross products linked to loan loss provisioning were neglected 
from these models. Since two new input variables would have considerably in-
creased the number of estimated parameters, we took into consideration only the 
cross products of loan-loss provisioning and loan amounts. Because of the limita-
tions regarding the number of parameters, we could not include the time variables 
into the model.
2.2. DEA models
DEA models describe banks’ cost minimisation or profit maximisation problem 
in the form of a linear programming exercise. The original model that assumes 
constant returns to scale for a specific bank can be written as follows:
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where n, s and m denote the number of banks, outputs and inputs, respectively, 
while x*i0 is the cost-minimising vector at constant input (wi0) prices and output 
levels (y*r0). Accordingly, the optimal vector is a linear combination of the inputs 
of those banks that produce at least as many outputs as the given bank without 
using more inputs. The efficiency of the evaluated bank can be calculated by 
comparing its actual cost level to the optimal cost level that is the efficiency of 
bank j = wij x*ij / wij xij. Thus the deviation from the efficiency frontier is equal to 
1- * /ij ij ij ij
i i
w x w x  . In the case of efficient banks, this value is zero. If a bank 
produced negative profit in a year, we determine profit inefficiency to be equal to 
1.7 Due to the definition of the model, the sample will always include a perfectly 
efficient bank.
As mentioned before, instead of constant returns to scale we assumed variable 
returns to scale. As a result, an additional condition was added to the model in 
relation to weights: 1 1j
n
j λ  . Equation (4) is based on the assumption that the 
input prices are uniformly given for each bank. This assumption is questionable 
from the perspective of funding costs; indeed, the foreign-owned banks or those 
in a better solvency position can generally access the less expensive funds. There-
fore, we adjusted the model in line with Tone’s (2002) proposition: each bank fac-
es unique input prices, and the input prices were included in the inequality condi-
tions applied to inputs. Moreover, we incorporated the loan loss provisioning of 
the loan portfolios and the control variables applied in SFA models into our DEA 
models as well, as quasi-fixed costs. Similar to the model proposed by Gulati 
and Kumar (2016), an inequality condition must hold for quasi-fixed costs in the 
same way as for the other costs. The quasi-fixed costs, however, do not appear in 
the objective function and they are not decision variables. Thus, the model used 
for the estimation of cost efficiency took the following form (where z denotes the 
quasi-fixed costs, while other denotations are the same as in equation 4):
7  While this method is in line with the literature, it is worth noting that this method may lead to 
loss of information if the majority of banks are in fact producing a loss. Bos – Koetter (2011) 
offer an alternative specification to alleviate this problem, where they change negative profits 
to be 1, and add an indicator variable that takes the absolute value of the losses, while for 
profitable banks the indicator variable is zero in logs.  
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Again, efficiency is received as the rate of optimal and actual costs. Profit 
efficiency is calculated on the basis of the same logic. All its assumptions are 
identical with those applied in the cost efficiency exercise, except for one: the 
output inequality constraint is replaced by a constraint pertaining to revenues. 
The revenues of bank j are denoted by Rj:
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  (6)
Finally, another assumption must be introduced for the estimation about whether 
the efficient frontier should be considered constant or variable over time. If we opt 
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for the latter, then the n parameter will indeed mean the number of banks and opti-
misations must be run separately for each individual period. If, however, we assume 
that technology remained constant throughout the review period, then the n index 
will be the product of the number of banks and the number of periods, in which case 
optimisations are performed all at once. While this assumption does not change the 
number of linear programming exercises that should be run, it changes the number 
of bank observations to be considered during one exercise. The latter option is sup-
ported by the argument that in the case of a small number of banks, the use of too 
many conditions would lead to a result where too many banks are extremely effi-
cient. However, it supports the use of the former option that DEA models do not take 
account of the random shocks sustained by banks and consequently, in this approach 
technology may easily change every year. Finally, we decided to take the middle 
road: we divided our sample into four parts, the operating environment of the bank-
ing system was roughly the same within each sub-sample. The first period lasts from 
2001 to 2004, when the Hungarian banking sector was characterised by balanced 
growth and forint-denominated loans. 2005–2008 was a period of excessive credit 
expansion and indebtedness in foreign currencies. 2009–2012 were crisis years pro-
ducing the greatest downturn, while 2013–2016 mark the period of recovery.
Accordingly, if we do not apply any constraint on the amount of λj-s, we assume 
constant returns to scale, while if we introduce the condition of 10 1j
n
j λ 
, then the returns to scale will be non-increasing. If the sum of λj-s equals 1, the 
technology has variable returns to scale. We also ran simulations with the lenient 
assumptions and checked for equality between the optimal results in different 
cases. Since the solutions were different for both lenient constraints, we decided 
to opt for the assumption of variable returns to scale and used this condition for 
SFA models as well.
2.3. Data
We used a balanced panel database that included the data of 12 Hungarian banks 
for the period between 2001 and 2016. The database includes banks which (1) 
have operated since 2001 in a continuous manner and (2) are operating on a mar-
ket-based principle (i.e. we didn’t include those banks in the database, which have 
special responsibilities stemming from the state, for example the Hungarian De-
velopment Bank and the EXIM Bank).8  We examined the data at an annual fre-
8  The database contains the following banks / banking groups: Budapest Bank, Cib Bank, Erste 
Bank, FHB Bank, Fundamenta, K&H Bank, KDB Bank, MKB Bank, OTP Bank, Raiffeisen 
Bank, UniCredit Bank, Volksbank / Sberbank. These institutions cover approximately 84 per 
cent of the Hungarian banking system on the basis of total asset. 
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quency, obtaining a total of 192 observations in the sample. With respect to the 
data, we relied on the statistics compiled by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) 
(including balance sheet, profit and loss statements and interest rate statistics). The 
number of observations in our database can be considered as less than ideal, how-
ever expanding it would only be feasible partially and not without sacrifices.9
As mentioned before, we defined three outputs for the cost efficiency esti-
mates: retail loans, corporate loans and other interest-bearing assets. The vast 
majority of retail loans consist of the loans granted to the household segment 
(mortgage loans and unsecured consumer loans). Corporate loans include loans 
granted to large corporations and SMEs as well. The majority of other interest-
bearing assets represent government bonds and instruments issued by the central 
bank, while loans disbursed to other sectors (such as local governments) make up 
the smaller part of these assets. The inputs and their prices presented in the model 
are consistent with those commonly used in literature. As inputs, we included 
interest-bearing liabilities (their price is the rate of interest expenses and interest-
bearing liabilities), personnel costs (their price is the ratio of personnel costs to 
balance sheet total) and material expenditures, including amortisation (their price 
is the ratio of expenditures and the bank’s total assets). The loan losses input 
includes the impact of loan loss provisions and also profit effect of portfolios 
sold at a price under their net value.10 In the case of cost efficiency estimates, the 
dependent variable is the sum of operating expenses and interest expenses, while 
in the case of profit efficiency models, our dependent variable is the sum of net 
interest income and net fee and commission incomes less operating expenses. In 
the estimates where loan losses were considered, we also added the impact of 
loan loss provisioning to the dependent variable.
We used three price variables for estimating the Lerner index. In addition to 
the interest income / interest-bearing asset ratio typically used in the literature, 
we also had the data needed to calculate the index with the average interest rate 
(or, in the case of the household segment, the APR) on new loan contracts and 
with the average interest rate of the portfolio weighted by loans outstanding. 
 9  Expanding the time dimension of the database would be possible by using data with a quar-
terly frequency, however considering the peculiar characteristics of banks’ operations (i.e. 
loan loss provisions set aside typically at the end of the year, or money-market transactions af-
fecting banks’ income more than one quarter within a year with an opposite sign) would bring 
substantial noise into the data within a year. The cross-section dimension of the data could be 
expanded with more institutions, however, these banks are special institutions operating on 
niche markets, which would make them outliers in our efficiency estimations.
10  Due to space limitations we could not include the detailed description of the database and the 
regression tables in this paper, however, it is available in Hungarian in the MNB Occasional Pa-
per version of this study (Dancsik – Hosszú 2017), or in English if requested from the authors. 
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The use of the latter two price variables is not common in literature, mainly 
because these statistics are published by central banks only at the sector-level. 
The same is true for breaking down the former indicators by loan segment: 
household and corporate interest income/interest rates can be rarely obtained 
from public data sources. 
3. RESULTS
Upon the estimation of SFA models, few control variables from the pool of pos-
sible control variables were eventually excluded from the estimates. The Lambda 
statistics – the ratio of the standard deviation of the two error terms – is an im-
portant sign of a bad specification. Therefore, we included only those control 
variables where the Lambda statistics took a value close enough to 1. In the case 
of profit functions the model includes only the size of capital buffers, whereas  in 
the case of cost functions it includes the size of capital buffers, the percentage of 
liquid assets and the number of branches. In DEA models the variables included 
as quasi-fixed costs are the same as the control variables used for the correspond-
ing SFA estimates.
3.1. Comparison of the model results
In line with the procedure of Bauer et al. (1998) and Dong et al. (2014), we ana-
lyse the relationship between the results of the models in 5 steps and evaluate the 
estimates. In the first step, we compare the descriptive statistics of inefficiency 
terms (Table 1).
Both the model families identified high cost efficiency and much lower profit 
efficiency based on both the mean and the median. Interestingly, even the median 
is zero for the cost efficiency calculated in DEA model which takes the loan 
losses into account. It means that at least half of the banking sector was quali-
fied as perfectly efficient by the model.11 Usually, the distribution of inefficien-
cies was slightly or more strongly left-sloped (except for the profit function of 
11  We would like to highlight here one more time that efficiency is always a relative concept in 
these models. We should keep in mind that when the model results indicate high average ef-
ficiency, it is only interpretable within the population of the Hungarian banks in the database. 
Based on these models we cannot state anything about the absolute efficiency of the Hungar-
ian banking sector as a whole (e.g. compared to other countries’ banking sector), i.e. it is pos-
sible that the Hungarian frontier itself is highly inefficient when compared to banks in other 
countries. 
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DEA model that disregards loan losses), which suggests that the distributions are 
more likely to show the outliers pointing to the worse performance. As regards 
the minimums,  SFA models do not consider either bank as perfectly efficient, 
whereas DEA models identified perfectly efficient banks in all cases. In the case 
of the observed maximum inefficiencies, the profit functions indicate the most in-
efficient banks. However, regarding the cost functions, the range of inefficiencies 
is far greater in DEA models. Owing to the higher maximum values, the standard 
deviations are higher in DEA models both in terms of profit and cost efficiency. 
Therefore, we may conclude that DEA models are more likely to show extreme 
efficiency values and that the banking sector is more homogeneous in terms of 
cost efficiency than in terms of profit efficiency.
The second aspect of the assessment is the comparison between correlations 
and rank correlations (Table 2). Our results are consistent with the part of the lit-
erature that points to a weak correlation between the two estimation procedures. 
Out of the 16–16 possible correlations and rank correlations we received posi-
tive values only in 2 and 3 cases, respectively, that were significant at 1 per cent 
level. Within the model family, the DEA results were moderately correlated (at 
all traditional significance levels), while the cost and profit efficiency estimates 
demonstrated a significant difference in the case of SFA models. Nevertheless, 
the strongest correlation was found within SFA models; the smallest differences 
occurred in estimates that included or excluded loan losses. Consequently, DEA 
models proved to be more robust, overall, for the specific model specification, 
but minor differences only slightly alter the results of SFA models. Moreover, the 
profit efficiency results showed a significant positive correlation even between 
the two model families (DEA and SFA), while this was not the case with cost ef-
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of inefficiencies (total sample)
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Mean 0,39 0,08 0,59 0,21 0,18 0,03 0,40 0,03
Median 0,32 0,00 0,70 0,06 0,10 0,02 0,26 0,03
Min. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,01
Max. 1,00 0,71 1,00 0,77 1,00 0,16 1,00 0,16
St.dev. 0,39 0,17 0,35 0,24 0,19 0,01 0,32 0,03
Source: Own calculations.
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ficiency. Therefore, profit efficiency is more robust for the estimation procedure 
than cost efficiency.
We can conclude similar statements to those derived from the correlations by 
comparing the set of banks considered to be the best and the worst by different 
methods (Table 3). The two approaches generate different results based on the 
percentage of the same banks classified into the top or the bottom quartiles and 
once again, the results of DEA models are closer to each other. It was also recon-
firmed that SFA models examining profit efficiency are more likely to arrive at 
similar results as those received by DEA models than the models estimating cost 
efficiency, irrespective of whether the DEA estimate was intended to gauge profit 
or cost efficiency.
We examined the stability of the estimated inefficiencies by autocorrelations 
(Table 4). None of the model estimates can be considered strongly autocorre-
lated, and even medium autocorrelations occur only in first-order cases. When 
comparing the parametric and the nonparametric methods, neither method can 
Table 2. Correlation and Spearman correlation of inefficiencies
DEA SFA
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DEA Profit including 
loan losses 1,00 0,50** 0,62** 0,48** 0,25*  –0,21* 0,40**  –0,19*
Cost including 
loan losses 0,45** 1,00 0,32** 0,69** –0,01  –0,15*  0,19*  –0,17*
Profit excluding 
loan losses 0,63** 0,26** 1,00 0.50** 0,21*  –0,18* 0,34** –0,14
Cost excluding 
loan losses 0,48** 0,60** 0,45** 1,00 –0,08  –0,18* 0,08  –0,21*
SFA Profit including 
loan losses  0,25** 0,06  0,16* –0,09 1,00  –0.16* 0.71** –0,12
Cost including 
loan losses  –0,18* –0,09  –0,15* –0,14  –0,22* 1,00  –0.18* 0.55**
Profit excluding 
loan losses  0,36** 0,13  0,36** 0,05 0,78**  –0,23* 1,00  –0.15*
Cost excluding 
loan losses   0,18* –0,14 –0,08 –0,14  –0,21* 0,70**  –0,18* 1,00
Note: Correlations that proved to be significant at 5% and at 1% significance levels are denoted by * and **, 
respectively. The upper triangle contains the correlations, while the lower triangle shows rank correlations. 
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 3. Classification of best and worst banks, (%)
DEA SFA
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DEA Profit including 
loan losses
1,00 0,52 0,65 0,48 0,33 0,21 0,23 0,19
Cost including 
loan losses
0,40 1,00 0,33 0,67 0,27 0,29 0,27 0,17
Profit excluding 
loan losses
0,69 0,35 1,00 0,35 0,33 0,19 0,27 0,19
Cost exluding 
loan losses
0,44 0,44 0,54 1,00 0,21 0,21 0,23 0,17
SFA Profit including 
loan losses
0,42 0,29 0,31 0,27 1,00 0,08 0,63 0,13
Cost including 
loan losses
0,10 0,15 0,13 0,19 0,19 1,00 0,08 0,63
Profit excluding 
loan losses
0,60 0,31 0,48 0,31 0,73 0,17 1,00 0,19
Cost excluding 
loan losses
0,25 0,19 0,25 0,13 0,17 0,60 0,15 1,00
Note: The values in the upper triangle show the percentage at which banks belonging to the worst quartile cor-
responded to each other. The lower triangle indicates the same value for the best quartile.
Source: Own calculations.
Table 4. Autocorrelations
DEA SFA
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1 0,32 0,12 0,49 0,37 0,49 0,18 0,47 0,30
2 0,25 –0,03 0,37 0,18 0,19 –0,15 0,16 0,05
3 0,20 0,01 0,18 0,09 –0,03 –0,22 0,11 0,09
4 0,12 0,14 0,08 0,22 –0,14 –0,09 0,01 –0,01
Source: Own calculations.
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be deemed more stable than the other in general; stability depends on the condi-
tions and on the order of the autocorrelation. By contrast, profit efficiencies are 
more strongly autocorrelated than cost efficiencies, except for the fourth-order 
autocorrelation. Similarly, the models estimated without the loan losses gener-
ally appear to be more stable than the calculations that take the loan losses into 
account. Indeed, we observed negative autocorrelations in the case of the latter. 
Presumably, this is because the exact value of the loan loss provisioning can be 
strongly influenced by accounting considerations; moreover, the prudent banks 
tend to recognise higher loan loss provisioning for large expected losses, which 
are partly reversed after the actual losses have been realised.
Since the stability of inefficiency measures is weak, we calculated the autocor-
relations of inefficiencies for each individual bank to examine the heterogeneity 
among banks (Table 5). In the case of the model estimated with the loan losses, 
autocorrelations were weak for almost all banks independently from the chosen 
estimation method. However, the other inefficiency indicators are characterized 
by high heterogeneity at individual level in almost all cases; the calculated auto-
correlations spread from weak negative to very high values. These results suggest 
that large, bank specific shocks are common in our sample.
Table 5. First order autocorrelation of inefficiency measures for each bank
Profit 
includ-
ing loan 
losses
Cost 
includ-
ing loan 
losses
Profit 
exclud-
ing loan 
losses
Cost 
exclud-
ing loan 
losses
Profit 
includ-
ing loan 
losses
Cost 
includ-
ing loan 
losses
Profit 
exclud-
ing loan 
losses
Cost 
exclud-
ing loan 
losses
1 0,91 0,45 0,78 0,61 0,75 0,18 0,81 0,19
2 0,21 –0,11 0,12 0,45 0,59 0,09 0,28 0,16
3 0,47 –0,09 0,71 0,45 0,59 0,29 0,72 0,62
4 0,86 –0,11 0,51 0,05 0,41 0,14 0,41 0,09
5 0,40 0,32 0,66 0,63 0,76 0,07 0,88 0,18
6 0,00 –0,07 0,54 –0,07 0,20 –0,01 0,17 0,28
7 –0,30 0,15 –0,20 0,10 0,40 0,38 0,13 0,29
8 0,92 0,85 0,94 0,79 0,23 0,04 –0,04 0,37
9 –0,42 0,15 –0,04 0,54 0,82 0,40 0,72 0,61
10 0,55 0,15 0,72 0,20 0,16 0,37 0,77 0,38
11 0,31 –0,07 0,76 0,14 0,47 0,08 0,47 0,13
12 –0,12 –0,15 0,35 0,57 0,54 0,12 0,32 0,28
Note: Autocorrelations higher than 0.6 (strong autocorrelations) are signed with gray colour. 
Source: Own calculations.
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Finally, we compared the estimated inefficiency measures with the profitabil-
ity and efficiency indicators derived from financial indicators (Table 6). We use 
four financial time series: return on average assets (ROAA), return on average 
equity (ROAE), ratio of total costs to total assets (TC/TA) and efficiency ratio 
(ER) (ratio of non-interest expenses and revenues). Since a higher value means 
a more profitable bank in the first two cases and a less efficient bank in the last 
two cases, we expect the estimated value to negatively correlate with the first two 
and positively correlate with the last two indicators. Our models yielded  mixed 
results based on these criteria as well: in the case of ROAA and ROAE, the profit 
inefficiency estimates produce the expected results with the appropriate sign and 
significance level, and the SFA estimates perform better than the DEA estimates. 
This should not be surprising, given that profitability as profit efficiency esti-
mates both consider expenditures and revenues alike. By contrast, it is clearly 
the DEA estimates that perform better in the case of the TC/TA indicator, regard-
less of whether they measure cost or profit efficiency. The results yielded by the 
SFA estimates do not match even in terms of sign. Our models demonstrate the 
worst performance in relation to the efficiency ratio; it is only in the case of cost 
efficiency ratio measured by DEA model without loan losses that a positive cor-
relation can be observed at 5 per cent significance level. 
The significant differences between the model results highlight the importance 
of the decisions and the assumptions lying behind the estimations. The SFA mod-
els are estimated on a longer time horizon, and are more flexible to the effect of 
shocks because of the random error term included in the model, while the DEA 
models are more prone to identify individual shocks as a change in efficiency.
Table 6. Comparison between the estimated inefficiencies and financial profitability and 
efficiency indicators
DEA SFA
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ROAA –0,14 0,14  –0,2* 0,23**  –0,43** –0,09  –0,35** 0,11
ROAE  –0,18* 0,07  –0,24** 0,18*  –0,45** –0,04  –0,37** 0,12
TC/TA 0,18* 0,39** 0,35** 0,33**  –0,17* –0,04 –0,05 –0,07
ER  –0,18* 0,07  –0,24** 0,18*  –0,45** –0,04  –0,37** 0,12
Note: Correlations that proved to be significant at 5 per cent and at 1 per cent significance levels are denoted 
by * and by **, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations.
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The difference between the two types of models is most spectacular in the year 
of 2012 characterised by more than one unique event, e.g. the early repayment 
scheme (and parallelly paying back foreign funds), the deepening euro crisis, 
and tensions in the FX swap market. At the same time, the low correlation with 
traditional efficiency ratios shows that these models grasp different aspects of 
efficiency, compared to the aspect offered by simple accounting-based ratios. All 
in all, we can conclude, that in order to develop a comprehensive evaluation of 
efficiency, it is essential to analyse it from more than one perspective.  
3.2. Effect of the crisis on effi ciency
Our results indicate that in terms of cost efficiency, the Hungarian banking sector 
is relatively homogeneous, even weaker banks are close to the efficient fron-
tier. This high relative effectiveness is confirmed by the results of SFA model 
throughout the entire sample, but only for the last few years of the sample by 
DEA model. 
The DEA (and to a smaller extent the SFA) estimates indicate that the Hungarian 
banks have improved their cost efficiency since 2005. The substantial part of this 
improvement took place after the outbreak of the crisis in parallel with a substantial 
cost adjustment (Figure 1). This relatively fast adjustment, however, was not fol-
lowed by an additional significant improvement, in which the erosion of banks’ loan 
portfolios played an important part (between 2009 and 2015, the loan portfolios 
declined continuously both in the household and the corporate segments). Conse-
quently, the environment was not supporting for an improvement in cost efficiency. 
The results of efficiency estimates are volatile. The DEA estimates point to a 
relevant decline in efficiency in 2012. This may reflect a government measure, 
the early repayment scheme of mortgage loans at a preferential rate, as a result of 
which a substantial part of a highly profitable portfolio was removed from banks’ 
balance sheet in two quarters.12 Banks could make cost adjustments only with 
some lag owing to the rapid time profile of the measures. This led to a temporary 
decline in efficiency. The efficiency estimates including loan losses showed a 
slight negative swing once again in 2014, reflecting exceptionally high write-
downs by two large banks. The DEA results differ from each other greater than 
12  Under the scheme, mortgage debtors indebted in foreign currency had an option to repay their 
loans at a far more favourable, fixed exchange rate instead of the prevailing market rates. As 
a result of the programme, the household loan portfolio shrank by HUF 1,041 billion (HFSA 
2012), which accounted for almost 13 per cent of the loans outstanding before the launch of 
the programme.
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the results of SFA models. This could be owing to the fact that in case of the SFA 
estimations, one part of the shocks is identified as random error, while in DEA 
models, these shocks figure as inefficiencies.
As regards profit efficiency, the standard deviation among banks is far greater 
compared to the cost efficiency estimate and it is far more difficult to identify a 
clear trend throughout the 11-year period we examine. This shows that a substan-
tial part of the inefficiency may be attributable to the revenue side of the profit 
and loss statement. The marked differences between the cost efficiency and the 
profit efficiency estimations confirm that there are aspects of inefficiency which 
do not stem from the relationship between inputs and outputs (in terms of stocks), 
but depend much more on the ability of banks to gather income from its existing 
assets. This finding is not surprising given the high level of non-performing loans 
characterizing the Hungarian banking system in crisis years.  
Looking more closely to the estimation, the pre-crisis period was featured 
by a gradual deterioration (Figure 2), which was also reflected in the gradual 
decline in the ROAA and ROAE profitability indicators of the banking sector. 
The deteriorating efficiency can be attributed to the saturation of markets and to 
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Figure 1. Cost efficiency estimate of Hungarian banks based on SFA and DEA cost functions
Note: The above values express individual banks’ cost efficiency weighted by balance sheet total, showing 
how close banks’ operational efficiency is to the efficient frontier on average. Higher values indicate higher 
efficiency levels. 
Source: Own calculation.
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the decline in margins. As a result of these developments a given quantity of in-
puts yielded far less profits than before. The profit efficiency reached its trough 
following the outbreak of the crisis. In this period, interest revenues decreased 
at several institutions owing to the rising share of non-performing loans and 
the slow erosion of the interest-bearing loan portfolio, with a parallel increase 
in credit losses and funding costs. The impact of the early repayment scheme 
on 2012 can also be identified in most profit efficiency estimates. In most of 
our estimates the average value of the last four years of the sample points to an 
improvement in profit efficiency compared to the average of the crisis period. 
However, the models show a slightly different picture once we look at the last 
four-year period: the profit efficiency (including loan losses) tends to demon-
strate an improvement in line with the decline in impairment needs (the DEA 
model shows a clear increase in efficiency, while the SFA model appears to 
indicate stagnation). The results of narrow profit efficiency estimates (including 
only the cost of funds and operating expenses) tend to show stagnation or even 
a moderate deterioration. 
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3.3. Household and corporate Lerner indices
As mentioned before, there are significant differences between the household and 
the corporate credit markets. According to our hypothesis, they diverge even in 
terms of the intensity of competition. We tested this assumption by using the 
Lerner index. The Lerner index shows the ratio of the profit margin (i.e. the por-
tion of the price that is not needed for covering the marginal cost of the product) 
compared to the price set by the company. It is calculated as p MCLerner
p
 , 
where p means the price and MC means the marginal cost of the product. The 
higher the value of the index, the more market power the participants have and 
the weaker is the competition among them (Lerner 1934).13 By deriving the SFA 
cost function we can calculate marginal costs both for the household and the cor-
porate credit market. We constructed the Lerner indices in three versions in both 
segments. The versions differed in two regards: whether they included credit risks 
and whether they referred to new disbursements or outstanding portfolios:
–  Lerner index for the portfolio is based on interest revenues. In this case, the 
price (the “p” value of the Lerner index) was received as the ratio of inter-
est revenues to loans outstanding to the given segment. The marginal cost 
estimates derived from the model that did not include loan losses, but only 
operating expenses and costs of funds.
–  The Lerner index for the portfolio is based on its interest rates. The price 
variable of the index is the interest rate weighted by the end-period portfo-
lio. In this case, the marginal cost also includes the volume of loan losses.
–  The Lerner index for new disbursements is based on APR / interest rate of 
new contracts. The price variable of the index is the average interest rate (or 
APR in case of household loans) of contracts concluded in the given year 
weighted by the loan amount. The marginal cost includes loan losses in this 
case as well: an average value was calculated for each bank from the loan 
losses observed for the total sample; consequently, for new loans we calcu-
lated with the loan loss across the entire cycle. As we highlighted before, 
the price of new loans may be substantially influenced by the composition 
effect, especially in the corporate segment, where loans with short maturity, 
13  It can be argued, that the Lerner index is not a proper tool to measure the market power of the 
banking system, since the index is only suitable for measuring the market power of corpora-
tions with homogenous customers, while banks’ pricing can be different for each customers. 
However, the latter statement is only true for a part of banks’ portfolio (first of all large cor-
porations), while pricing of loans for smaller customers happens usually on a portfolio level, 
differentiated by a few variables. Using the Lerner index is a common practice for measuring 
banks’ market power in the international literature as well. 
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large volume and low interest rates can easily dominate average interest 
rates in the case of some institutions. In the light of that, interpreting the 
three indices simultaneously is recommended, while analysing the index 
based on new loans by themselves requires proper caution.14 
Based on the indices, we found that competition was extremely intense in the 
corporate credit market and less intense in the household credit market through-
out the period under scrutiny. This result is fairly consistent with the literature’s 
previous findings on the Hungarian bank competition. Moreover, the inclusion or 
exclusion of credit risks does not alter the conclusions, which show very similar 
results both in terms of level and dynamics.
14  In theory, the composition effect could be adjusted by estimating our cost functions with more 
outputs (by differentiating the corporate and the household loans output on the product level). 
With this change it would be possible to calculate the Lerner indices for each product by using 
different marginal costs and interest rates for each output.  However, this would require us to 
drastically increase the number of variables in our estimation, which is not possible consider-
ing the number of observations in our database.
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Source: Own calculation.
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The Lerner indices calculated for the corporate credit market (Figure 3) stay in 
the positive range, slightly above zero, up until the outbreak of the crisis, showing 
a nearly continuous downward shift. This indicates an extremely high competi-
tion within the segment. The eruption of the crisis is followed by a steep decline, 
especially in the case of the indices constructed on the basis of interest revenues 
and portfolio interest rates. The decline in the latter suggests that banks did not 
take into consideration credit risks adequately with respect to these loans, and 
the interest revenues collected upon the emergence of the loan losses were insuf-
ficient to cover the costs.
As regards the new contracts, the index again exhibited a downward shift dur-
ing the years of the crisis. However, the index declined at a slightly slower pace 
than observed in the case of the portfolio indices. This is because banks could 
raise the spreads on new loans, passing on the credit losses to their customers – 
something that they were unable to do in the case of the outstanding portfolio. 
That notwithstanding, the declining trend can also be observed in the index of 
new disbursements; moreover, the value of the index moves within the negative 
range consistently, which reflects banks’ high competition for new customers. 
Indeed, the  banks tightened their credit standards significantly after the outbreak 
of the crisis, and competed for the remaining companies that were still considered 
solvent. The companies’ bargaining position was so strong that the lending rates 
offered by banks did not even cover the costs in many cases.15 
The downward trend has reversed in recent years, and all the three indices start-
ed to increase. The portfolio based indices reached their trough in 2012 and 2013, 
while the index calculated on the basis of new contracts dropped to the minimum 
in 2015.16 It played an important role in the rising of the index that the credit risks 
declined in response to the economic growth and the recovery of the real estate 
market. In addition, the banks’ funding costs decreased considerably owing to the 
central bank’s easing cycle and credit stimulus programmes (Funding for Growth 
Scheme [FGS] and Market-Based Lending Scheme [MLS])17. A composition ef-
fect also contributed to the upward drift in the index. There has been a shift in 
corporate lending towards the smaller-size companies with smaller market power 
in recent years, while the large corporations with a strong bargaining position 
15  At the same time, besides loan disbursement, banks could obtain an income from these com-
panies in numerous other ways: for example, they could provide payment services to the 
companies or execute investment and derivative transactions on their behalf in exchange for a 
commission. Thus, overall, it was worth pricing some loans under the marginal cost to prevent 
customers from signing up with another bank.
16  It should be emphasised again that the average interest rate on new loans in the corporate seg-
ment can be significantly biased because of the composition effect.
17 For more detail on the central bank’s credit stimulating instruments (Bodnár et al. 2017).
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have increasingly started to borrow funds directly from abroad. Therefore, the 
percentage of companies against which banks could enforce their market power, 
increased. Consequently, in 2016 all three Lerner indices took positive values 
once again, which suggest that the banking sector started to regain its profit gen-
erating capacity even in the corporate credit market.
Starting from 2004, the intensity of competition increased in the household 
credit market parallel to the surge in foreign currency lending. This period is 
often referred to as “risk-based competition” in the literature (Banai et al. 2010), 
which means that the intensifying competition among banks was reflected in the 
undertaking of increasingly high risks rather than price reductions. After the out-
break of the crisis, however, the index hiked back to the level observed in 2004 
immediately in the case of new loans, and gradually in the case of the portfolio. 
Compared to the corporate segment, it is noteworthy that the banks clearly re-
tained their market advantage over households: as opposed to the corporate loans. 
This also manifested itself in the unilateral raising of the interest rates on the 
outstanding portfolio (Figure 4).18
18  As mentioned earlier, this is largely because banks were allowed to modify the interest rates 
stipulated in retail loan contracts unilaterally, whereas the lending rates on corporate loans 
were typically linked to a benchmark rate. 
Figure 4. Estimated Lerner indices in the household credit market
Source: Own calculation.
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After the outbreak of the crisis, the index of new disbursements exhibited no 
significant changes until 2011. In 2012 during the period of the early repayment 
scheme,  the high-interest-rate of refinancing loans pushed the value of the index 
upward again.19 In line with the recovering credit supply and the upswing in the 
credit market, the value of the index decreased between 2013 and 2015. Despite 
improving the credit losses and better economic prospects, banks raised their 
interest margins in 2016, which led to another rise in the index.
By contrast, the indices capturing the developments on the outstanding portfo-
lio exhibited a gradual and nearly continuous hike since the outbreak of the crisis 
until today. This upward trend was not interrupted even by the statutory reduc-
tion of interest rates (the so-called Settlement and conversion of foreign currency 
loans to forint in 2015), in which the moderating funding costs and the decreasing 
credit losses played important roles.20 We can conclude overall, that the banks had 
high market power in the household credit market in 2016 as well.
It is worth to compare the Lerner index to simple indicators that are based on 
the difference of interest rates and money market rates.21 Figure 5 presents the 
size of lending spreads for the new loans in both segments in the banking system 
as a whole (i.e. not only for institutions included in the database we presented 
before). It is important to emphasise that this indicator differs from the Lerner 
index in several aspects. First of all, it only takes funding costs into account. Sec-
ondly, it assumes that these funding costs are equal to some chosen money market 
rates, while banks’ real funding cost are typically quite different from them. For 
example, the money market rates do not mirror the increase in FX funding cost 
after the breakout of the crisis (stemming from the increase in country risk), or the 
decrease in the price of deposits in the latter years (stemming from the increasing 
share of sight deposits). Instead, the Lerner index takes into account of the bank’s 
real funding cost and the marginal cost derived from it, while it also includes the 
effect of operative expenses and credit losses.
19  According to the subsequent inspections, in this period banks coordinated their strategies and 
scaled back their credit supply collectively, which was reflected in the sudden jump in the 
interest rates. Following the inspection, the Hungarian Competition Authority imposed a total 
fine of HUF 9.5 billion on the institutions involved in the collusion.
  http://www.gvh.hu/sajtoszoba/sajtokozlemenyek/2013-as_sajtokozlemenyek/8456_hu_95_
milliardos_birsag_a_vegtorleszteses_banki_kartell_ugyben.html 
20  Most banks reversed impairments in 2015 and 2016, which means that their credit “losses”, in 
net terms, contributed to the increase in their profit (MNB 2016, 2017).
21  The publications of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank monitor the change in spreads regularly: both 
Trends in Lending published each quarter, and the Financial Stability Report published every 
half-year contain analysis about lending spreads.
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The household lending spreads are significantly higher than spreads in the 
corporate loan segment, which partially strengthens the results of the Lerner in-
dices, however, it also mirrors the effect of non-inclusion of other cost elements. 
The dynamics of the average spread in the household segment is also similar to 
the development of the Lerner index. We can separate the period before the crisis 
characterized by increasing competition, the period of rising credit costs just after 
the crisis, and the increase in competition in the last few years.  
In the corporate segment, based on simple spreads above the money market 
rate, it is much harder to identify the developments we discussed previously. One 
factor behind this is the difference in funding costs. If we calculate the spreads 
with banks’ real funding cost, then real spreads would be lower after the break-
out of the crisis, while they would be higher in the last few years mirroring the 
development of the Lerner index in a better way. Apart from the difference in 
funding costs, another factor that we do not take into account is one of the most 
important dimension i.e. credit losses. We have argued previously that banks’ 
interest rates were not sufficient to cover the losses stemming from credit risk. 
However, we lose this aspect entirely, if we only analyse spreads above money 
market rates. Finally, as we already highlighted before, the composition effect 
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may play a substantial role in the segment of new corporate loans (because of the 
continuously changing, often dominant share of money-market loans with short 
maturity), which makes drawing proper conclusions quite difficult.
4. SUMMARY
 This paper examines the cost and profit efficiency of the Hungarian banking sec-
tor by using parametric and nonparametric models with or without the inclusion 
of credit risks.  By comparing the estimated results from different models it also 
examines which estimates were more stable over time or correlated more closely 
with the profitability and the efficiency indicators constructed from specific fi-
nancial indicators. Further, the paper calculates Lerner indices separately for the 
household and for the corporate credit markets in a number of ways.
According to our results, the Hungarian banking sector is homogeneous from 
the perspective of cost efficiency. However, it proved to be heterogeneous in 
terms of profit efficiency, displaying significant divergence across institutions. 
DEA models are more likely to show outliers of the two modelling techniques. 
Various models measure the performance of individual banks differently. While 
the results of DEA models are moderately correlated, the results from SFA mod-
els show strong correlation between profit and cost efficiency. Moreover, the esti-
mates for profit efficiency exhibited significant correlations with each other irre-
spective of the model type applied. Regarding stability, we cannot clearly identify 
which method performs better of the parametric and nonparametric techniques. 
However, the profit efficiency estimates, once again, outperformed the cost ef-
ficiency estimates. Moreover, models including loan loss provisioning seemed 
to be less stable. Comparison with financial performance indicators revealed a 
co-movement between the profitability indicators (ROAA, ROAE) and the profit 
efficiency estimates, while the results from DEA models are correlated better 
with the ratio of total costs to total assets. None of the models displayed a strong 
correlation with the efficiency ratio. Overall, the estimates from several models 
should be taken into consideration for supporting the regulatory decisions regard-
ing bank efficiency.
The crisis exerted a positive effect on systemic cost efficiency. Banks respond-
ed to the negative shock by rationalising their activity, while the bankruptcy or 
the acquisition of less efficient institutions may also have improved sector-level 
results. From the perspective of profit efficiency, the first few years following 
the crisis were characterised by deterioration in the wake of credit losses and 
the loss of income. However, the recovery in economic growth, the decline in 
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credit losses and the rationalisation of banks’ operation have also resulted in an 
improvement in profit efficiency in recent years.
By using the SFA type cost functions, we constructed Lerner indices separately 
for the household and the corporate credit markets. The two segments show a 
mixed picture with respect to market power. Banks were characterised by high 
Lerner indices in the household credit market, while intense competition was ob-
served in the corporate credit market. We estimated two Lerner indices with one 
including credit risk explicitly and the other including the same implicitly.  Our 
results proved to be robust for this difference. The Lerner indices calculated for 
new disbursements proved to react faster than the portfolio indices in both mar-
kets. Such large differences in market power indicate that it is worth modelling 
the two markets separately from a regulatory perspective.
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